| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpu: host1x: Fix race in syncpt alloc/free
Fix race condition between host1x_syncpt_alloc()
and host1x_syncpt_put() by using kref_put_mutex()
instead of kref_put() + manual mutex locking.
This ensures no thread can acquire the
syncpt_mutex after the refcount drops to zero
but before syncpt_release acquires it.
This prevents races where syncpoints could
be allocated while still being cleaned up
from a previous release.
Remove explicit mutex locking in syncpt_release
as kref_put_mutex() handles this atomically. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfsplus: fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create
When sync() and link() are called concurrently, both threads may
enter hfs_bnode_find() without finding the node in the hash table
and proceed to create it.
Thread A:
hfsplus_write_inode()
-> hfsplus_write_system_inode()
-> hfs_btree_write()
-> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0)
-> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0)
Thread B:
hfsplus_create_cat()
-> hfs_brec_insert()
-> hfs_bnode_split()
-> hfs_bmap_alloc()
-> hfs_bnode_find(tree, 0)
-> __hfs_bnode_create(tree, 0)
In this case, thread A creates the bnode, sets refcnt=1, and hashes it.
Thread B also tries to create the same bnode, notices it has already
been inserted, drops its own instance, and uses the hashed one without
getting the node.
```
node2 = hfs_bnode_findhash(tree, cnid);
if (!node2) { <- Thread A
hash = hfs_bnode_hash(cnid);
node->next_hash = tree->node_hash[hash];
tree->node_hash[hash] = node;
tree->node_hash_cnt++;
} else { <- Thread B
spin_unlock(&tree->hash_lock);
kfree(node);
wait_event(node2->lock_wq,
!test_bit(HFS_BNODE_NEW, &node2->flags));
return node2;
}
```
However, hfs_bnode_find() requires each call to take a reference.
Here both threads end up setting refcnt=1. When they later put the node,
this triggers:
BUG_ON(!atomic_read(&node->refcnt))
In this scenario, Thread B in fact finds the node in the hash table
rather than creating a new one, and thus must take a reference.
Fix this by calling hfs_bnode_get() when reusing a bnode newly created by
another thread to ensure the refcount is updated correctly.
A similar bug was fixed in HFS long ago in commit
a9dc087fd3c4 ("fix missing hfs_bnode_get() in __hfs_bnode_create")
but the same issue remained in HFS+ until now. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: stm32-csi: Fix dereference before NULL check
In 'stm32_csi_start', 'csidev->s_subdev' is dereferenced directly while
assigning a value to the 'src_pad'. However the same value is being
checked against NULL at a later point of time indicating that there
are chances that the value can be NULL.
Move the dereference after the NULL check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: storage: sddr55: Reject out-of-bound new_pba
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.
new_pba comes from the status packet returned after each write.
A bogus device could report values beyond the block count derived
from info->capacity, letting the driver walk off the end of
pba_to_lba[] and corrupt heap memory.
Reject PBAs that exceed the computed block count and fail the
transfer so we avoid touching out-of-range mapping entries. |
| A local privilege-escalation vulnerability has been discovered in the HPE Aruba Networking Virtual Intranet Access (VIA) client. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a local attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution with root privileges. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: fix regbuf vector size truncation
There is a report of io_estimate_bvec_size() truncating the calculated
number of segments that leads to corruption issues. Check it doesn't
overflow "int"s used later. Rough but simple, can be improved on top. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_event: validate skb length for unknown CC opcode
In hci_cmd_complete_evt(), if the command complete event has an unknown
opcode, we assume the first byte of the remaining skb->data contains the
return status. However, parameter data has previously been pulled in
hci_event_func(), which may leave the skb empty. If so, using skb->data[0]
for the return status uses un-init memory.
The fix is to check skb->len before using skb->data. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: fix potential deadlock while nr_requests grown
Allocate and free sched_tags while queue is freezed can deadlock[1],
this is a long term problem, hence allocate memory before freezing
queue and free memory after queue is unfreezed.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/0659ea8d-a463-47c8-9180-43c719e106eb@linux.ibm.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: dealloc commit test ctx always
The damon_ctx for testing online DAMON parameters commit inputs is
deallocated only when the test fails. This means memory is leaked for
every successful online DAMON parameters commit. Fix the leak by always
deallocating it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: micrel: always set shared->phydev for LAN8814
Currently, during the LAN8814 PTP probe shared->phydev is only set if PTP
clock gets actually set, otherwise the function will return before setting
it.
This is an issue as shared->phydev is unconditionally being used when IRQ
is being handled, especially in lan8814_gpio_process_cap and since it was
not set it will cause a NULL pointer exception and crash the kernel.
So, simply always set shared->phydev to avoid the NULL pointer exception. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm, swap: fix potential UAF issue for VMA readahead
Since commit 78524b05f1a3 ("mm, swap: avoid redundant swap device
pinning"), the common helper for allocating and preparing a folio in the
swap cache layer no longer tries to get a swap device reference
internally, because all callers of __read_swap_cache_async are already
holding a swap entry reference. The repeated swap device pinning isn't
needed on the same swap device.
Caller of VMA readahead is also holding a reference to the target entry's
swap device, but VMA readahead walks the page table, so it might encounter
swap entries from other devices, and call __read_swap_cache_async on
another device without holding a reference to it.
So it is possible to cause a UAF when swapoff of device A raced with
swapin on device B, and VMA readahead tries to read swap entries from
device A. It's not easy to trigger, but in theory, it could cause real
issues.
Make VMA readahead try to get the device reference first if the swap
device is a different one from the target entry. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix potential UAF in smb2_close_cached_fid()
find_or_create_cached_dir() could grab a new reference after kref_put()
had seen the refcount drop to zero but before cfid_list_lock is acquired
in smb2_close_cached_fid(), leading to use-after-free.
Switch to kref_put_lock() so cfid_release() is called with
cfid_list_lock held, closing that gap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: fix multifs mds auth caps issue
The mds auth caps check should also validate the
fsname along with the associated caps. Not doing
so would result in applying the mds auth caps of
one fs on to the other fs in a multifs ceph cluster.
The bug causes multiple issues w.r.t user
authentication, following is one such example.
Steps to Reproduce (on vstart cluster):
1. Create two file systems in a cluster, say 'fsname1' and 'fsname2'
2. Authorize read only permission to the user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname1'
$ceph fs authorize fsname1 client.usr / r
3. Authorize read and write permission to the same user 'client.usr' on fs 'fsname2'
$ceph fs authorize fsname2 client.usr / rw
4. Update the keyring
$ceph auth get client.usr >> ./keyring
With above permssions for the user 'client.usr', following is the
expectation.
a. The 'client.usr' should be able to only read the contents
and not allowed to create or delete files on file system 'fsname1'.
b. The 'client.usr' should be able to read/write on file system 'fsname2'.
But, with this bug, the 'client.usr' is allowed to read/write on file
system 'fsname1'. See below.
5. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.usr'
$sudo bin/mount.ceph usr@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_usr/
6. Try creating a file on file system 'fsname1' with user 'client.usr'. This
should fail but passes with this bug.
$touch /kmnt_fsname1_usr/file1
7. Mount the file system 'fsname1' with the user 'client.admin' and create a
file.
$sudo bin/mount.ceph admin@.fsname1=/ /kmnt_fsname1_admin
$echo "data" > /kmnt_fsname1_admin/admin_file1
8. Try removing an existing file on file system 'fsname1' with the user
'client.usr'. This shoudn't succeed but succeeds with the bug.
$rm -f /kmnt_fsname1_usr/admin_file1
For more information, please take a look at the corresponding mds/fuse patch
and tests added by looking into the tracker mentioned below.
v2: Fix a possible null dereference in doutc
v3: Don't store fsname from mdsmap, validate against
ceph_mount_options's fsname and use it
v4: Code refactor, better warning message and
fix possible compiler warning
[ Slava.Dubeyko: "fsname check failed" -> "fsname mismatch" ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/guc: Add devm release action to safely tear down CT
When a buffer object (BO) is allocated with the XE_BO_FLAG_GGTT_INVALIDATE
flag, the driver initiates TLB invalidation requests via the CTB mechanism
while releasing the BO. However a premature release of the CTB BO can lead
to system crashes, as observed in:
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:h2g_write+0x2f3/0x7c0 [xe]
Call Trace:
guc_ct_send_locked+0x8b/0x670 [xe]
xe_guc_ct_send_locked+0x19/0x60 [xe]
send_tlb_invalidation+0xb4/0x460 [xe]
xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_ggtt+0x15e/0x2e0 [xe]
ggtt_invalidate_gt_tlb.part.0+0x16/0x90 [xe]
ggtt_node_remove+0x110/0x140 [xe]
xe_ggtt_node_remove+0x40/0xa0 [xe]
xe_ggtt_remove_bo+0x87/0x250 [xe]
Introduce a devm-managed release action during xe_guc_ct_init() and
xe_guc_ct_init_post_hwconfig() to ensure proper CTB disablement before
resource deallocation, preventing the use-after-free scenario. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vmw_balloon: indicate success when effectively deflating during migration
When migrating a balloon page, we first deflate the old page to then
inflate the new page.
However, if inflating the new page succeeded, we effectively deflated the
old page, reducing the balloon size.
In that case, the migration actually worked: similar to migrating+
immediately deflating the new page. The old page will be freed back to
the buddy.
Right now, the core will leave the page be marked as isolated (as we
returned an error). When later trying to putback that page, we will run
into the WARN_ON_ONCE() in balloon_page_putback().
That handling was changed in commit 3544c4faccb8 ("mm/balloon_compaction:
stop using __ClearPageMovable()"); before that change, we would have
tolerated that way of handling it.
To fix it, let's just return 0 in that case, making the core effectively
just clear the "isolated" flag + freeing it back to the buddy as if the
migration succeeded. Note that the new page will also get freed when the
core puts the last reference.
Note that this also makes it all be more consistent: we will no longer
unisolate the page in the balloon driver while keeping it marked as being
isolated in migration core.
This was found by code inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Use correct exit on failure from futex_hash_allocate_default()
copy_process() uses the wrong error exit path from futex_hash_allocate_default().
After exiting from futex_hash_allocate_default(), neither tasklist_lock
nor siglock has been acquired. The exit label bad_fork_core_free unlocks
both of these locks which is wrong.
The next exit label, bad_fork_cancel_cgroup, is the correct exit.
sched_cgroup_fork() did not allocate any resources that need to freed.
Use bad_fork_cancel_cgroup on error exit from futex_hash_allocate_default(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/radeon: Remove calls to drm_put_dev()
Since the allocation of the drivers main structure was changed to
devm_drm_dev_alloc() drm_put_dev()'ing to trigger it to be free'd
should be done by devres.
However, drm_put_dev() is still in the probe error and device remove
paths. When the driver fails to probe warnings like the following are
shown because devres is trying to drm_put_dev() after the driver
already did it.
[ 5.642230] radeon 0000:01:05.0: probe with driver radeon failed with error -22
[ 5.649605] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5.649607] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[ 5.649620] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 357 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110
(cherry picked from commit 3eb8c0b4c091da0a623ade0d3ee7aa4a93df1ea4) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gpusvm: fix hmm_pfn_to_map_order() usage
Handle the case where the hmm range partially covers a huge page (like
2M), otherwise we can potentially end up doing something nasty like
mapping memory which is outside the range, and maybe not even mapped by
the mm. Fix is based on the xe userptr code, which in a future patch
will directly use gpusvm, so needs alignment here.
v2:
- Add kernel-doc (Matt B)
- s/fls/ilog2/ (Thomas) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix system hang caused by cpu-clock usage
cpu-clock usage by the async-profiler tool can trigger a system hang,
which got bisected back to the following commit by Octavia Togami:
18dbcbfabfff ("perf: Fix the POLL_HUP delivery breakage") causes this issue
The root cause of the hang is that cpu-clock is a special type of SW
event which relies on hrtimers. The __perf_event_overflow() callback
is invoked from the hrtimer handler for cpu-clock events, and
__perf_event_overflow() tries to call cpu_clock_event_stop()
to stop the event, which calls htimer_cancel() to cancel the hrtimer.
But that's a recursion into the hrtimer code from a hrtimer handler,
which (unsurprisingly) deadlocks.
To fix this bug, use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() instead, and set
the PERF_HES_STOPPED flag, which causes perf_swevent_hrtimer()
to stop the event once it sees the PERF_HES_STOPPED flag.
[ mingo: Fixed the comments and improved the changelog. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: Implement gettimex64 with -EOPNOTSUPP
gve implemented a ptp_clock for sole use of do_aux_work at this time.
ptp_clock_gettime() and ptp_sys_offset() assume every ptp_clock has
implemented either gettimex64 or gettime64. Stub gettimex64 and return
-EOPNOTSUPP to prevent NULL dereferencing. |
